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RESPONSE 
Paul W. Taylor 
1. I would like to clarify at the outset what it 
means to make value judgments from a non-con-
scious organism's standpoint (or what it means 
to take that standpoint in making such judg-
ments). The phrases "from X's standpoint" or 
"taking X's standpoint" can be eliminated 
entirely, if we wish. We would then simply talk 
about making judgments concerning what ben-
efits X or harms X when using, as our standard 
for such judgments, the preservation and 
enhancement of X's existence and well-being. 
To make such judgments on the basis of that 
standard is to take the organism's standpoint. 
Doing this need not require imagining ourselves· 
to be the organism, or empathetically identi-
fying with it, or fancifully placing ourselves in its 
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situation, or the like. Watson affirms that 
objective considerations, knowable in ordinary 
empirical ways, can provide evidence for the 
truth ofjudgments about what is good or bad for 
an organism without presupposing that it is con-
scious. So we both agree that it is possible to 
make correct judgments about these matters on 
objective grounds. However, I would want to 
emphasize that accurate, sustained, and biologi-
cally enlightened observations of an organism 
and its reactions to its environment enable us to 
make more reliable judgments of that sort -
judgments that are more likely to be true than 
those made under less favorable epistemic condi-
tions. I would also add that our understanding of 
an organism's nature and of why it does what it 
does is augmented and deepened as we become 
directly acquainted with it as a unique individual. 
There is nothing mysterious about this kind of 
acquaintanceship or familiarity. It occurs, for 
example, when a person takes daily care of a 
houseplant and sees to its healthy growth. 
2. It is unfortunate that my term "moral 
subject" gave rise to the idea that I was assuming 
every entity that is a moral subject to be con-
scious. The traditional term "moral patien t" 
means the same thing, but I avoided using it 
because it sounds odd to readers who ordinarily 
think of "patients" in health care contexts. But 
my definition of "moral subject" (quoted by 
Watson) makes clear that the presence of con-
sciousness, or even simple sentience, is not 
implied. 
3. Now for the central point. If we do regard a 
living thing (conscious or non-conscious) as 
having inherent worth (or "moral consider-
ability", i.e., as being worthy of the moral consid-
eration of all moral agents), then true judgments 
about what benefits it become components of 
reason-for-action propositions. Such propositions 
are of the form: The fact that a certain act will 
benefit an organism is a reason to do it, other 
things being equal. To generalize: For any action 
X, if X is instrumental to the preservation or 
well-being of an animal or plant, X ought to be 
done for that reason, other things being equal. 
Correspondingly, for any action Y that is 
destructive or detrimental to the existence and 
well-being of an animal or plant, that fact about Y 
is a (prima facie) reason why it ought not be 
done. To respect nature is to believe that wild 
animals and plants have inherent worth and to 
act accordingly. And this is to accept the fact that 
an action will preserve the natural existence of a 
wild animal or plant as a reason for doing it, and 
to accept the fact that an action will harm a wild 
animal or plant, or will destroy its wildness, as a 
reason against doing it. 
This view presupposes a conception of indi-
vidual organisms as teleological centers of life. 
The best defense of this conception is to be 
found in a very recent article: Harley Cahen, 
"Against the Moral Considerability of 
Ecosystems" (Environmental Ethics 10/3 (1988), 
pp. 195-216.). Cahen presents a clear analysis of 
teleological concepts and explanations in biology 
and shows how non-conscious organisms can cor-
rectly be said to be goal-oriented. Cahen also 
explains in what sense living things, unlike 
machines, mountains, and other inanimate 
objects, have goals of their own. 
4. If respecting nature entails accepting the 
aforementioned reason-for-action propositions, 
what is the rational justification for accepting 
them? Whatever it may be, it will also be thejusti-
fication for regarding all wild living things as 
having inherent worth and hence the justifi-
cation for adopting the ultimate moral attitude 
of respect for nature. Watson says that, according 
to my view, "... the only way to argue for adopting 
an ultimate moral attitude is to exhibit what it 
would mean for moral agents to believe and act 
on it." This is not my view. I hold that the only 
way to argue for adopting an ultimate moral 
attitude is by showing the rational acceptability of 
a system of nonmoral beliefs about the world (in 
particular, the system of beliefs I call the bio-
centric outlook) and then showing the 
coherence that holds between these beliefs and 
the ultimate attitude (which entails the inco-
herence involved in accepting the beliefs and 
adopting any attitude incompatible with the 
ultimate one). There is no circularity here, since 
the justification of the beliefs does not require 
the taking of the attitude, nor does it assume that 
the attitude is itselfjustified. 
5. On the matter of rights, in my book I argue 
against using the language of rights to ground 
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the duties we have to nonhumans. I try to show 
why the use of such language tends to be mis-
leading. (Watson quotes one of my arguments 
for this, from page 247 of my book.) If having 
moral rights is taken to mean nothing more than 
having inherent worth, however, then my 
argument (based on coherence with the bio-
centric outlook) that all animals and plants have 
inherent worth is also an argument that all 
animals and plants have moral rights. 
6. It is true that only human moral agents can 
believe that animals and plants have inherent 
worth and only such humans can attribute that 
kind of value to them. But these facts leave open 
the question: Do animals and plants in truth 
have inherent worth? If they do, they are 
deserving of moral consideration by any actual 
moral agents. Should there come a time when no 
moral agents exist, animals and plants would not 
thereby lose their inherent worth. It's just that no 
one would then recognize such worth and no 
moral consideration of those who deserve it 
would be forthcoming. We don't create their 
worth, we recognize it (if we are in the epistemic 
position of being able to recognize it). Their 
worth, it might be said, is a moral fact, the exis-
tence of which does not depend on the existence 
of moral agents. (In this respect inherent worth 
is to be contrasted with intrinsic value and 
inherent value.) One might call this a form of 
moral realism. It has to do with the truth of 
reason-for-action propositions, not with their jus-
tification (the reasons for believing them to be 
true). 
7. A final note. Professor Watson's claim that I 
have expressed "genocidal hatred for the human 
race" is a total distortion of my thought. First, the 
whole thrust of my argument in the book right 
up to the end is that human ethics (human 
duties and rights based on the foundation of 
respect for persons) must be brought into 
balance with environmental ethics (our duties to 
wild living things based on the foundation of 
respect for nature). I never claim that environ-
mental ethics should take priority over human 
ethics, much less overthrow or replace it. 
Secondly, the particular passage Watson refers to 
in my book is a hypothetical assertion made in 
the context of an imaginary state of affairs in 
which the human species has become extinct. 
The statement reads: "And if we were to take the 
standpoint of that Life community [now under-
stood as all wild animals and plants, Homo sapiens 
having disappeared] and give voice to its true 
interest, the ending of the human epoch on 
Earth would most likely be greeted with a hearty 
'Good riddance!'" (page 115). I leave it to the 
reader to decide whether this hypothetical 
assertion expresses genocidal hatred for the 
h u'man race. 
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